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 SCHWARZER, District Judge. 
  
 Appellants, a group of conservation, fishing, boating, 
civic, realty and educational groups, brought this action  
against the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Environmental 
  
Protection Agency (EPA), the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (Port Authority) and various federal officials, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the ocean dumping of 
materials dredged from the Port Authority’s Newark/Port Elizabeth 
facility.  The district court denied the application for a 
preliminary injunction and this appeal followed.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order denying 
the preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1)(West Supp. 
1994).  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the 
action under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (West Supp. 1994) (federal 
question), 33 U.S.C. §1415(g)(West Supp. 1994)(Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)), and 5 U.S.C. §704 (West 
Supp. 1994) (Administrative Procedure Act). 
 I. 
 On May 26, 1993, the Corps issued a permit allowing the Port 
Authority to dredge up to 500,000 cubic yards of material from 
its Newark/Port Elizabeth facility and dispose of the material at 
an ocean mud dump site six miles off the New Jersey shore.  The 
material to be dumped contained dioxin.  On June 1, 1993, 
appellants filed this action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief and sought, but were denied, a temporary restraining order 
against the proposed ocean dumping.  
 At the close of the hearing on appellants’ application for a 
preliminary injunction on June 7, 1993, the district court, in an 
oral ruling, denied the application.  The court found that on the 
record before it, there was insufficient evidence to show that 
defendants had complied with the detailed procedures necessary 
  
under the EPA’s ocean dumping regulations to demonstrate that 
dioxin was present in the materials to be dumped only as a trace 
contaminant with no significant undesirable effects.  It 
concluded that the record did not support the Corps’ finding that 
the permit met the requirements of the EPA’s ocean dumping 
regulations and that appellants therefore were likely to succeed 
on the merits of their claim.  The court further found, however, 
that the catastrophic injuries to the shipping industry, to 
longshoremen and other workers, and to the public at large, which 
would result from the failure to dredge, outweighed the minimal 
or non-existent injuries to plaintiffs, since the dredging under 
the permit would have no significant adverse environmental 
effects.  Finally, the court stated that it was highly likely 
that defendants would be able to establish that dioxin was 
present only in trace quantities or, alternatively, obtain a 
waiver from the Secretary of the Army.  While denying the 
application, the court also ordered the Port Authority either to 
establish that the permit was lawfully issued under the EPA’s 
regulations or to pursue a waiver, and it ordered the Corps to 
issue no further permits for dumping at the dump site until 
compliance had been established or a waiver obtained. 
    Appellants did not appeal the denial of the preliminary 
injunction at that time, and in excess of 450,000 cubic yards has 
since been dumped at the site.1  Meanwhile the Port Authority 
                                                 
 
    1 No party argues that the appeal should be treated as moot. 
Since the permit will not expire until January 1996 and has not 
been exhausted, we agree that the appeal is not moot. 
  
submitted a memorandum and supporting exhibits to the court to 
demonstrate that the permit had been lawfully issued.  In a 
ruling issued on July 6, 1993, the court found that defendants 
had failed to perform all the tests required to qualify dioxin as 
a trace contaminant but that it appeared likely that if all the 
tests were performed, dioxin in the dumped material would be 
classified as a trace contaminant.  Accordingly, the court 
granted defendants until September 1, 1993 to perform additional 
tests and to submit a memorandum demonstrating their compliance 
with regulatory requirements.  Defendants as well as plaintiffs 
submitted additional materials.   
 On June 28, 1994, the district court issued the opinion from 
which the instant appeal was taken, once again denying the 
request for a preliminary injunction.  This time the court 
concluded that “the bioassays which defendants conducted met the 
regulatory requirements and support the conclusion that the 
sludge dioxin is a trace contaminant falling outside the dumping 
prohibition of [33 C.F.R.] §227.6(a).”  It held that “reading the 
regulations in their entirety, . . . it is apparent that the 
government agencies reserved wide discretion in themselves to 
determine which tests should be conducted and the manner of 
conducting those tests.” 
      II. 
 When ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
district court must consider four factors:  the likelihood of 
success on the merits; the extent of irreparable injury from the 
conduct complained of; the extent of irreparable harm to the 
  
defendants if a preliminary injunction issues; and the public 
interest.  Opticians Association of America v. Independent 
Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3rd Cir. 1990).  In 
reviewing the district court’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction, we “cannot reverse unless the trial court has 
committed an obvious error in applying the law or a serious 
mistake in considering the proof.”  Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral 
Wine & Liquor Co. 731 F.2d 148, 150 (3rd Cir. 1984); Opticians 
Association, 920 F.2d at 192.  We hold that the district court 
committed a serious error in applying the law with respect to the 
defendants’ compliance with the EPA regulations but that both the 
balance of harms and the public interest support the denial of 
the preliminary injunction. 
  
      III. 
 The MPRSA (the Act) prohibits the dumping of materials into 
the ocean except as authorized by a permit issued by the EPA. 33 
U.S.C. §1411 (West Supp. 1994).  Section 1412 of the Act directs 
the EPA to “establish and apply criteria for reviewing and 
evaluating . . . [ocean] permit applications.”  The EPA has 
adopted such criteria for the evaluation of permit applications 
for ocean dumping of materials.  40 C.F.R. part 227 (1992)(the  
Regulations).  The Regulations state, in relevant part, that 
ocean dumping of “materials containing . . . constituents  
. . . suspected to be carcinogens . . . as other than trace 
contaminants . . . will not be approved” [other than on an 
emergency basis, not applicable here].  40 C.F.R. 
§227.6(a)(5)(all emphasis herein is added).  The Regulations 
establish the procedure for qualifying constituents “suspected to 
be carcinogens” as only trace contaminants.   
 First, the Regulations state the criterion for qualification 
as trace contaminants: 
 These constituents will be considered to be present as trace 
contaminants only when they are present . . . in such forms 
and amounts in liquid, suspended particulate, and solid 
phases that the dumping of the materials will not cause 
significant undesirable effects, including the possibility 
 of danger associated with their bioaccumulation in 
marine  organisms. 
40 C.F.R. §227.6(b).  Next, the Regulations specify the procedure 
for determining whether the constituents qualify under the above 
  
criterion, that is, whether the constituents have a potential for 
causing significant undesirable effects, as follows: 
   The potential for significant undesirable effects due to the 
presence of these constituents shall be determined by 
 application of results of bioassays on liquid, 
suspended  particulate, and solid phases of wastes 
according to procedures acceptable to EPA, and for dredged 
material, acceptable to EPA and the Corps of Engineers.  
40 C.F.R. §227.6(c).  The Regulations then address the procedures 
for making that determination:  “Materials shall be deemed 
environmentally acceptable for ocean dumping only when the 
following conditions are met.”  Id.  Two of the stated conditions 
are relevant here.  The first condition relates to the suspended 
particulate phase of the waste (i.e. the water column during the 
dumping) and states that “bioassays shall be conducted with 
appropriate sensitive marine organisms as defined in 
§227.27(c)[which defines them as pelagic organisms, i.e. those 
that live in the water column] using procedures . . . approved by 
EPA and the Corps of Engineers” to establish the absence of 
“significant mortality or significant adverse sublethal effects 
including bioaccumuluation . . .”  40 C.F.R. §227.6(c)(2). 
Section 227.6(c)(2) further specifies the procedures for 
conducting bioassays under the section.   
 The second condition relates to the solid phase of the waste 
(i.e. the deposit on the ocean floor) and states that “bioassays 
shall be conducted with appropriate sensitive benthic marine 
organisms [i.e. organisms that live on the ocean floor] using 
  
benthic bioasssay procedures . . . approved by EPA and the Corps 
of Engineers” to establish the absence of “significant mortality 
or significant adverse sublethal effects . . .”  40 C.F.R. 
§227.6(c)(3). 
 The plain meaning of these Regulations is that the dumping 
of materials containing dioxin is prohibited unless the dioxin is 
present only as a trace contaminant; that dioxin can qualify as a 
trace contaminant only when it will not cause significant 
undesirable effects; and that the determination whether dioxin 
will cause significant undesirable effects is to be made by 
conducting specified tests, including bioassays in the suspended 
particulate and solid phases of the waste on specified types of 
marine organisms.  The court found and it is undisputed that no 
bioassays were conducted on the suspended particulate phase.  It 
further found and it is undisputed that bioassays were performed 
on the solid phase of the waste with only one benthic (ocean 
floor) species, not with three species as required by §227.27(d). 
 In concluding that the agencies had reserved discretion to 
themselves to determine which tests to conduct, the district 
court relied on the language of §227.6(c), which provides: “The 
potential for significant undesirable effects due to the presence 
of these constituents shall be determined by application of 
results of bioasssays on liquid, suspended particulate, and solid 
phases of wastes according to procedures acceptable to EPA, or, 
for dredged material, acceptable to EPA and the Corps of 
Engineers . . .” 
  
 The EPA’s reservation of discretion to determine how to 
conduct tests cannot be read as a reservation of discretion to 
determine whether to conduct tests required by the unequivocal 
language of its regulations.  The Regulations make a clear  
distinction between requiring a test and determining how to 
conduct it when they state that “[t]hese bioassays shall be 
conducted with appropriate sensitive marine organisms as defined 
in §227.27(c) using procedures for suspended particulate phase 
bioassays approved by EPA . .  and the Corps . . .” §227.6(c)(2). 
Similar language is used in §227.6(c)(3) with respect to solid 
phase testing of waste. 
 “Generally we defer to an agency’s consistent interpretation 
of its own regulations unless it is ‘plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”  Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 
453 (3rd Cir. 1994), quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co. 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).  But “this deference does not permit us 
to defer to an ‘interpretation’ . .  that strains ‘the plain and 
natural meaning of words . . .’” Id., quoting Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 
(3rd Cir. 1987).  It is “our duty to independently insure that 
the agency’s interpretation comports with the language it has 
adopted.”  Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. 
Gardner, 882 F.2d 67, 70 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
 The language of the EPA’s Regulations is unambiguous.  We 
find that the interpretation adopted by the defendants and 
accepted by the court is inconsistent with the plain meaning of 
that language.  While the MPRSA gives the EPA broad rule-making 
  
authority under which it could have reserved to itself the 
discretion it now claims, it simply failed to do so.  See Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1954). 
 Defendants contend that under the EPA’s long-standing 
interpretation of its Regulations, it has never required 
bioaccumulation testing on the suspended particulate phase.  They 
point to the Dredged Material Testing Manual (the “Green Book”), 
first issued by the EPA in 1977 and again in an updated version 
in 1991. 55 Fed.Reg. 8191 (Mar. 7, 1990); 56 Fed.Reg. 13,826 
(Apr. 4, 1991).  The 1991 Green Book states, reiterating similar 
text in the 1977 edition, that ‘[b]ioaccumulation from the 
material in the water column is generally of minor concern, due 
to the short exposure time and the low exposure concentrations, 
resulting from rapid dispersion and dilution.” 59 Fed.Reg. 26568 
(May 20, 1994). The Green Book, the court found, does not specify 
a suspended particulate bioaccumulation test.2 
 It appears to us that the Green Book is intended to 
implement the provisions of the Regulations that tests be 
conducted “using procedures approved by EPA and . . . the Corps.”  
If the Green Book’s omission of procedures for suspended 
particulate testing were read as the agency’s interpretation of 
                                                 
 
    2 Defendants do not argue, nor did the court find, that the 
Green Book supports their failure to comply with the requirement 
that three benthic species be tested with the solid phase.  What 
the district court found was that the test procedures followed 
were the most conservative and would produce results of the worst 
case scenario and that they established that the proposed dumping 
would create no significant undesirable effects.  That finding, 
however, does not support the court’s conclusion that “the 
testing complied with the requirements of §227.6(c)(3)”.  
  
its Regulations, however, it could be given no force for it would 
be in direct conflict with those Regulations.  Gardner, 882 F.2d 
at 70.  An agency guideline or directive that conflicts with the 
plain meaning of a regulation is invalid.  National Family 
Planning & Reproductive Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 
234-36 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  
 If the Green Book were read as an attempt to amend the 
Regulations, it would fail as well. The EPA issued the 
Regulations under its authority to “establish and apply criteria 
for reviewing and evaluating . . . [ocean dumping] permit 
applications.”  33 U.S.C. §1412(a).  An agency is bound by the 
express terms of its regulations until it amends or revokes them.  
Facchiano Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 
213 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 80 (1993), citing United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); see also Accardi, 
347 U.S. at 266-67.  Once a legislative rule such as the 
Regulations is adopted, its substantive provisions may be changed 
only by compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 USC §553(b)(A)(West Supp. 
1994);  Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d at 457.  
   The announcements of the 1991 edition of the Green Book did 
not purport to be an exercise of EPA’s rule-making authority.  
See 55 Fed.Reg. 8191 (Mar. 7, 1990); 56 Fed.Reg. 13,826 (Apr. 
4,1991).  The 1991 announcement describes the Green Book as 
replacing the 1977 edition, which it states “provided guidance 
for implementing the environmental evaluations required under the 
ocean dumping regulations to determine the acceptability of 
  
dredged materials for ocean dumping . . . to ensure compliance 
with EPA’s environmental criteria.”  56 Fed. Reg. at 13,827.  By 
way of contrast, the EPA’s exercise of its rule making authority 
is illustrated by the announcement of its interim final rule in 
which it adopted a clarification of the Regulations’ suspended 
particulate phase testing provisions subsequent to the 
commencement of this litigation.  59 Fed.Reg. 26,566 (May 20, 
1994).  Thus the Green Book is merely a guidance document which 
cannot be given the effect of amending the Regulations. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s holding 
that defendants complied with the EPA’s Regulations constitutes 
serious error in applying the law.   
 IV. 
 At the initial hearing on appellants’ application for 
injunctive relief, the court found that the functioning of the 
port is of extraordinary economic importance to the ocean 
carriers and longshoremen directly affected by the curtailment 
and eventual cessation of activities and to the entire region 
which is already suffering from serious economic conditions.  The 
catastrophic injuries to these interests and the public at large 
outweigh the minimal or non-existent injuries to appellants since 
no significant adverse environmental effects were shown to 
result.  Appellants take no issue with these findings but contend 
that they are irrelevant to the controlling considerations under 
the MPRSA and the Regulations.  The argument misses the point.  
The question here is not whether the Corps or the EPA may take 
economic considerations into account in issuing the permit but 
  
rather whether the court’s equitable power should be exercised on 
behalf of appellants.  It is clear that the district court must 
weigh the balance of harms in determining whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction and we cannot say that in doing so here, 
it abused its discretion. 
 In light of appellants’ failure to show the requisite 
irreparable injury, the order of the district court denying a 
preliminary injunction will be affirmed.       
  
 
